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Abstract 
Over the last three decades, governments have commercialised and corporatised many of their 
government business enterprises (GBEs) without privatising them under New Public 
Management (NPM) policy, which requires them to act as a corporate sector entity. These 
GBEs have independent boards that are responsible for the corporate governance of these 
entities, including the hiring of chief executive officers (CEOs) and determining their 
compensation. We examine the association between pay and performance for CEOs of GBEs 
and find that the levels and changes in CEO compensation are not associated with GBE 
performance despite being the explicit intent of NPM and regulatory policy. We suggest that 
this corporate governance failure could be due to the composition of the GBE boards. Our 
evidence shows that only 11.29% of directors appointed have public listed company experience 
with the balance of director appointments, being either senior public servants or political 
appointments who may lack the motivation or have any incentive to closely monitor CEO 
compensation. Accordingly, we suggest some possible policy changes to both the 
determination of CEO compensation and the composition of GBE boards.  
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1.0 Introduction 
Over the last thirty years, governments worldwide have commercialised and corporatised 
traditional public sector business operations. This process is often referred to in the literature 
as “New Public Management” (NPM), (Hood 1989, 1991; Lane 2000; Gruening 2001). As a 
result of this process, some business enterprises have been fully privatised; some have been 
partially privatised and listed on a stock exchange with the government retaining a controlling 
interest in these entities1. This paper focuses on government business enterprises (hereafter 
GBEs) that have been decoupled from traditional government controlled bureaucratic 
management and operating structures with the government retaining 100% ownershio. These 
organisations have been transformed to operate in a manner consistent with corporate sector 
governance and management structures with the intention of improving their efficiency and 
effectiveness (Brignall and Modell, 2000). 
The international academic community has provided evidence on different aspects of the 
economic consequences of these policies. A number of studies have focused on the 
determinants of CEOs’ compensation under different corporate governance mechanisms and 
the association between CEO pay and performance. For example Jaiswall and Bhattacharyya 
(2016) and Gunasekhar and Dinesh (2017) show that there is not a pay/performance relation 
for partially privatised Indian Central State Owned Enterprises, referred to as Public Sector 
Undertakings’ (PSUs), as CEO compensation is determined by a Central Pay Commission. Cao 
et al. (2018), provide evidence that CEOs of Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are 
prepared to trade off their pay levels for political promotion. Further, political promotion is 
positively associated with the economic performance of the SOEs. 
                                                 
1 For example in China, many of the State Owned Enterprises and in India Public Sector Undertakings have 
been partially privatised with a controlling interest retained by the government. 
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We build on these studies and ask the research question, ‘Is there a pay / performance relation 
for CEOs of GBEs in a setting where the enterprise is 100% government owned,  all board 
members and the CEO require approval by the responsible government minister and CEO 
compensation is determined by the board?’ This setting for GBEs is evident in Australia, the 
European Union including the United Kingdom (European Commission 2016) and New 
Zealand (Cahan, Chua, Nyamori 2005; New Zealand Government 2018).  Our evidence is 
based on the Australian setting. 
Our motivation is twofold. First, evidence on the pay / performance relation for public listed 
companies is extensive and the findings indicate that on average there is a positive relation 
between CEO compensation and firm performance (Murphy 2013; Shan and Walter 2016). 
While some concerns have been expressed about these findings (Bebchuk and Fried 2003, 
2004, 2005), more recent regulations have reinforced shareholder rights to reject executive 
compensation (Monem and Ng 2013;  Grosse, Kean, Scott 2017). 
In the Australian setting, the corporate governance mechanism for GBEs are unlike those for 
public listed companies (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). In particular, GBEs do not have public 
shareholders and management do not face the threat of discipline from mergers and 
acquisitions. Further, whilst they have borrowing rights, the government explicitly or implicitly 
guarantees their loans. The key elements of GBE corporate governance are as follows. Each 
member of the board of directors and the CEO have to be nominated to the relevant 
‘shareholder  minister’ of the day for final approval. The shareholder minister can override a 
nomination and has the regulatory authority to appoint his nomination to a board position or to 
be the CEO. The auditor general is primarily concerned with the economic performance of a 
GBE but is not consulted or involved in the determination of the CEO’s compensation. The 
annual reports of GBEs are tabled in parliament and politicians may ask questions about the 
CEOs’ compensation. 
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Given the limited external monitoring of GBEs, the financial press provides indirect monitoring 
of  many board activities including CEO compensation. Articles published in the financial 
press, have questioned board appointments and the levels and growth in CEO compensation 
(Rajca 2017; Davies 2015; Silmalis 2013). Whether the current governance structure with its 
limited external monitoring of CEO compensation links CEOs compensation to the GBEs 
performance remains an empirical question, on which we provide evidence.  
Our second motivation is that GBEs represent a significant proportion of the Australian 
economy. For example, between, 2006-2013, the average total assets “of all levels of 
Government Public Non-Financial Corporations” represented approximately 28% (approx. 
$368 billion) of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).2 Accordingly, governments and society, in 
general, have a vested interest in ensuring the effectiveness of asset utilisation and creating 
efficiencies in revenue generating capabilities leading to the maximisation of dividends it 
receives from GBEs. Consequently, both the government and board of directors need to ensure 
that CEO remuneration practices are designed to achieve optimal outcomes in accordance with 
legislative requirements that clearly specify quantifiable financial outcomes.  
Based on hand collected data for a sample of 430 GBE years between 2006 and 2013 
(inclusive), our results do not provide evidence of a systematic relation between the levels and 
changes of CEO compensation and independently verifiable financial performance measures.  
The only explanatory factor that is found to explain CEO pay levels consistently is GBE size, 
as measured by both revenues and total assets. Notably, CEO pay is also positively associated 
with board compensation, suggestive of ineffective compensation practices and the potential 
                                                 
2 ABS Tables, 55120DO069_201314 Government Finance Statistics, Australia, 2013-14; 55120DO033_201314 
Government Finance Statistics, Australia, 2013-14, Table 3 Total all levels of Government Public Non-financial 
Corporations Balance Sheet; 5206.0 Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product 
Table 34. Key Aggregates and analytical series, Annual - Gross domestic product: Current prices. 
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for cronyism (Brick, Palmon, Wald 2006). These results are consistent for both GBEs affected 
by community service obligations (CSOs) as well as those GBEs which do not have CSOs. 
This paper makes a number of important contributions. First, we contribute to the growing 
academic literature on alternative governance mechanisms for GBEs, as compared to SOEs 
and PSUs. Our evidence is consistent with Jaiswall and Bhattacharyya (2016) and Gunasekhar 
and Dinesh (2017). They find that there is no relation between CEOs’ compensation and the 
performance of PSUs, under the Indian model of corporate governance. In India PSUs are 
partially privatised and CEO compensation is determined by an external tribunal. Our evidence 
is also consistent with Matolcsy, Wells and Lee (2006) and Cao, Lemmon, Pan, Qian and Tian  
(2018) who find that the pecuniary component of CEOs’ compensation has limited association 
with the performance of partially privatised SOEs in China.  
Second, this paper also contributes to the public debate on the pay / performance relation of 
CEOs’ compensation. For example, recent newspaper articles with the heading “Australia Post 
CEO Ahmed Fahour's salary unreasonable when compared to international peers” (Uhlmann, 
2017) and “PM calls Aust Post chairman over CEO Pay” (Rajca 2017; Kelly 2017) are 
examples of the public interest in CEO compensation in GBE’s. We investigate and provide 
evidence on whether the compensation paid to CEOs of GBEs is tied to financial performance 
measures and hence provides evidence relevant to this public and regulatory debate.3 Our 
findings suggests that, on average, CEO compensation is not associated with GBEs’ financial 
performance. Hence, policy makers may be well served to reassess the experience, structure 
                                                 
3 Currently, policy makers have been debating whether CEO (Principal Executive Officer - PEO) compensation 
for GBEs needs to conform with and be approved by Government Remuneration Tribunals (Durie and Palmer 
2017). 
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and composition of GBE boards and / or explicitly offer short term incentives in CEOs 
compensation based on publicly available financial and operational targets4.  
The rest of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and theory 
development. Section 3 describes the sample and data used in the study and details the research 
design. Section 4 reports the main results of the study, section 5 provides summary results of 
sensitivity tests, and the conclusions, policy implications and suggestions for future research 
are detailed in section 6. 
2.0  Institutional setting and hypothesis development 
2.1  Institutional setting 
In Australia, NPM gained traction in the 1980s enabling successive governments to enact 
legislation5 replacing large bureaucratic public sector departments with decentralised fully 
owned government business units.6 This process was applied in those situations where a unique 
identifiable consumer or geographic market existed. Consequently, governance structures were 
developed for GBEs that enabled the transfer of authority, accountability and responsibility to 
an independent board of directors under the umbrella of a separate, legally incorporated entity. 
Australian Government legislation for GBEs is outlined in the ‘Public Governance, 
Performance and Accountability Act 2013’ (PGPA Act 2013).7 Section 5 of the PGPA Act 
                                                 
4 In our sample only 22% of CEO compensation observations received bonus payments and in most instances 
the targets on which they were based were not publicly disclosed. 
5 Australian Government, Government Business Enterprises (Miscellaneous Reforms) Act 1988. 
6 The Australian Capital Territory passed legislation in 1990 enabling the creation of ‘Territory Owned 
Corporations’(TOCs);  New South Wales in 1989 enabling the creation of State Owned Corporations’ (SOCs); 
Queensland in 1993 and the Northern Territory in 2014 enabling the creation of ‘Government Owned 
Corporations’ (GOCs); Tasmania in 1995 and South Australia in 1996 enabling the creation of Government 
Business Enterprises (GBEs); Victoria in 1992 enabling the creation of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs); Western 
Australia in 1916 with the passing of the ‘State Trading Concerns Act’. 
7 Australian Government, Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 replaced the Financial 
Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act) and the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 
1997 (CAC Act) on 1 July 2014. 
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stipulates that Commonwealth companies are required to meet high standards of governance, 
performance and accountability. Further, in the Australian Government Department of Finance 
publication, “Resource Management Guide No. 126 (RMG 126) ‘Commonwealth Government 
Business Enterprise Governance and Oversight Guidelines’ (August 2015)” it is stated on page 
3: 
“1.8  A principal objective for each GBE is that it adds to its shareholder value. To 
achieve this it should … operate and price efficiently… subject to the 
government imposing price conditions to satisfy CSOs … earn at least a 
commercial rate of return, that leads to recovering the full cost of the resources 
employed, including the cost of capital ….achieving a principal financial target 
and a dividend policy, agreed in advance with the Shareholder Ministers.”  
The objectives, targets and performance measurement systems as specified by the 
Commonwealth government are also evident in the legislation created by the individual states 
and territories in Australia, which comprise an additional eight jurisdictions.8 Australian 
Government RMG 126, section 3 (table 4, page 12) specifies performance measures to be 
reported about (i) financial (ii) business efficiency (iii) leverage/solvency (iv) customers and 
stakeholders and (v) staff. Examples of RMG 126 performance measures include total 
shareholder return, dividend yield and return on capital employed, etc. Accordingly, we use 
                                                 
8 ACT Parliament, Territory-owned Corporations Act 1990. Northern Territory of Australia, ‘Government Owned 
Corporations’ Act 2014’.New South Wales Government Australia, State Owned Corporations Act 1989. 
Queensland Government, Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, (Current as at 1 July 2014); South 
Australian Government, “Government Business Enterprises (Competition) Act 1996’. Tasmania, ‘Government 
Business Enterprises Act 1995’. Victorian Government, State Owned Enterprises Act 1992. Western Australia, 
‘State Trading Concerns Act 1916’. 
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accounting numbers extracted from financial statements as the foundation for evaluating the 
pay / performance relation for CEOs of GBEs.9  
Corporate governance characteristics  
For GBEs, there is a multi-tiered agency relationship comprising the public, the incumbent 
government, the shareholder minister(s) of the day, the board of directors and, finally, the CEO. 
Unlike the corporate sector, there are no direct residual equity ownership rights. The fact that 
the responsible minister(s) has overriding power may lead to actions that compromise good 
governance for political gain or bias (Ackerman 2006; Davies 2015). This overriding power is 
derived from ownership, which in accordance with RMG 126, (page 3), states that “ownership 
interest is generally represented by two ‘Shareholder Ministers’… being the responsible 
minister for the GBE and the Finance Minister ….” who then report to parliament on the 
performance of the GBEs. Hence, the shareholder minister(s) has the ultimate authority for the: 
(i) Appointment or dismissal and remuneration of the Chairman and Directors; 
(ii) Approval of board recommendation regarding CEO appointment, succession, 
termination and remuneration.10  
The power of the shareholder minister(s) opens the possibility that Board and CEO 
appointments may be influenced by the applicants’ political status or their political affiliation.11 
                                                 
9 A GBE’s accounting performance may be adversely affected by government imposed community service 
obligations (CSOs). We control for whether this affects the levels and growth in CEO compensation through the 
inclusion of an indicator variable for those GBEs affected by CSOs. 
10 Australian Government Department of Finance publication, “Resource Management Guide No. 126 (RMG 126) 
‘Commonwealth Government Business Enterprise Governance and Oversight Guidelines’ (August 2015)” 
paragraphs 2.7 to 2.11 (pages 5-6). 
11 In Australia, there are three main political parties, namely the Liberal, Labor and Green party. Along with these 
parties are a number of independents, who under certain conditions may wield the balance of power for one of the 
major parties. Appointments may be made on the basis of the ex-politician’s status irrespective of their affiliation 
or it may be a result of their political affiliation. That is, a Labor government may appoint ex-Liberal politicians 
and vice versa (for example, Peter Costello in December, 2009, ex treasurer and retired politician from the Liberal 
government being appointed by a Labor Government to the board / chairman of the Australian Government Future 
Fund). 
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Our evidence shows that 74% of CEO appointments comprise ex-politicians and / or senior 
government employees. Although one of the objectives of NPM is to remove politics from 
administration, this has not always been the case. A newspaper article titled, “Coalition 
government appoints its political friends and colleagues to boards”, disclosed that there have 
been “…more than 50 appointments of ex- Liberal or National politicians, relatives of 
politicians, or prominent conservative thinkers since October 2013 after the Coalition 
government came to power” (Davies, 2015). Additionally, it is not uncommon for politicians 
who lose their seat in an election or who retire from parliament to be appointed to boards of 
GBEs (Davies, 2015). Consequently, political interference in the appointment of board 
members may have implications that compromise good governance and effective monitoring. 
The Auditor General will assess the accuracy of the accounts and comment on economic 
performance, but does not participate in the determination of CEO compensation. 
2.2 Empirical evidence on the pay / performance relation in the public sector 
Cutler and Waine (2005) review performance-related-pay (PRP) in the United Kingdom public 
sector and conclude that there are two problematic aspects associated with the transparency of 
this practice, being (i) the complexity of pay determination and (ii) difficulties in finding 
“unproblematic” performance measures that can be linked to pay. Using meta-analysis12 and a 
vignette study, Weibel, Rost and Osterloh (2009) find that the impact of financial rewards on 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation leads to only “modest success of pay for performance in the 
public sector (page 19)”. Their vignette study finds that “Pay for Performance” (PFP) in some 
instances undermine performance in so far as it strengthens extrinsic motivation while 
weakening intrinsic motivation thus producing hidden costs by way of increased compensation.  
                                                 
12 A meta-analysis uses statistical analytical techniques combining the results of multiple prior studies. 
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In the Indian setting Jaiswall and Bhattacharyya (2016), find no relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance for PSUs, however, CEO compensation increases with 
tenure, organisation size and the number of independent directors on the board. Sridhar and 
Kumar (2015) also investigate executive compensation in India and find that executive 
compensation for PSUs are significantly less than those in private firms and performance as 
measured by return on assets (ROA) is insignificant in the determination of levels and changes 
in CEO compensation. Further, Swami (2005) found that PSUs do not utilise incentive pay 
plans to reward managerial performance.  
In China, the government is usually the largest shareholder of SOEs and retains ultimate control 
including the selection, appointment and dismissal of CEOs. Cao et al. (2018) investigate the 
relationship between pay and performance for Chinese SOEs and report that CEOs with a 
higher likelihood of political promotion have lower pay levels and lower pay / performance 
sensitivity. Additionally, they find that a positive relationship between pay and performance 
weakens when a CEO has a higher likelihood of receiving a political promotion, which is 
consistent with the idea that political advancement substitute for compensation incentives. 
Further, Li and Zhou (2005) find that a region’s economic performance has a positive 
association with provincial leaders’ promotions to central government positions.  
Mengistae and Xu (2004) find that the pay/performance sensitivity of CEO compensation in 
Chinese SOEs increases with the marginal productivity of executive actions. They also 
document that the pay/performance sensitivity in Chinese SOEs is of a similar magnitude as 
found for regulated industries in the United States, which in turn, is lower than that found in 
unregulated firms.  
Chen , Fan and Wong (2004) find that firms with politically connected CEOs underperform by 
37% those firms without politically connected CEOs. They conclude that the appointment of 
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politically connected CEOs does not enhance firm efficiency but fulfill personal or political 
goals that are inconsistent with firm value maximization.  
As far as we know, to date the pay/performance relation for CEOs have not been tested in a 
setting where the government owns 100% of the entity, with the board of directors being 
responsible for the determination of CEO compensation, with limited oversight by politicians 
of the GBEs activities. Accordingly, we provide evidence on the pay/performance relation of 
CEOs of fully owned GBEs utilising information contained in the financial statements of the 
annual reports prepared by Australian GBEs covering the period 2006 – 2013. The use of 
financial performance measures represents a core component of NPM in supporting the 
“philosophical drive for a more “efficient”, “effective” and “accountable” public sector” 
(Guthrie, Parker and English 2003, p. 3). 
2.3 Theory Development and Hypothesis 
Much of the literature on CEO compensation and firm performance is based on the concept of 
efficient contracting. The theoretical foundation of efficient contracting is agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory posits that the separation of ownership and 
control of a business enterprise leads to agency costs, caused by the misalignment of incentives 
between shareholders and management. Shareholders aim to reduce a firm’s agency costs by 
utilising various corporate governance mechanisms including monitoring management 
decisions via the board of directors, independent auditors, periodic reporting and continuous 
disclosure requirements. Shareholders also aim to reduce agency costs by bonding the CEOs’ 
interest with their own interests through their compensation contracts. An efficient 
compensation contract includes structured incentives to optimize firm value (Murphy, 2013, p 
214). The structured incentives include both short and long-term incentives based on financial 
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and market based targets and therefore, researchers predict a positive relation between CEO 
compensation and firm performance. 
More recently, Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004, 2005) question the validity of efficient 
contracting theory. They argue that executives can capture their board and consequently 
influence the levels and composition of their own compensation through managerial power. 
However, a recent detailed review of the history of executive pay in the US by Murphy (2013) 
suggests that the efficient contracting and managerial power explanations are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. He reconciles these two approaches by arguing that both theories ignore 
important political and taxation considerations and other intangible influences on managerial 
compensation. Furthermore, recently introduced legislation all around the world has enhanced 
shareholders’ ability to reject excess CEO compensation (Monem and Ng 2013, Grosse et al. 
2017). 
Much of the empirical evidence on CEOs’ compensation is consistent with efficient contracting 
theory (Murphy 2013; Shan and Walter 2016). However, there is also emerging evidence on 
the managerial power explanation of CEOs’ compensation, primarily on how managers may 
influence the long-term incentive components of their compensation contract (Bebchuk, 
Grinstein and Peyer 2010; Abernathy, Kuang and Qin 2015). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) identify the agency and governance issues associated with entities, 
which are ultimately owned by society, but are controlled by senior government bureaucrats 
and / or politicians. They argue that since bureaucrats and politicians do not have cash-flow 
rights, they have little incentive to align shareholders (that is, societal) interests with the GBEs 
performance. In Australia, GBEs are 100% government owned and their legal charter focuses 
on their financial performance which is primarily monitored by their board of directors and the 
relevant Auditor General. Parliaments and the shareholder minister(s) also provide oversight 
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of the GBEs performance as discussed in Section 2.1. However, levels and changes in the 
CEOs’ compensation are determined by the board of the GBE without political oversight from 
the shareholder minister or external tribunal. Indirect monitoring comes from the financial 
press who report on what society may deem is overly generous CEO compensation. (Peatling 
2012; Durie and Palmer 2017). Core Guay and Larcker (2008) investigates the effectiveness of 
media monitoring of CEO compensation and find little evidence that firms respond to negative 
press coverage by decreasing CEO compensation or increasing CEO turnover. 
Given that GBEs do not have publicly traded shares, the composition of CEO compensation 
cannot include market based long-term incentives such as equity options. Further, short-term 
incentives such as bonuses are rare as only 22% of our observations include short term 
incentives in the form of cash bonuses.  Therefore, the primary incentive available to CEOs of 
GBEs is the annual increase in their total compensation. 
If the board of directors is an effective monitoring mechanism it is expected that CEO 
compensation in GBEs is efficient and reflects GBE performance. This leads to our first 
hypothesis: 
H0: There is a positive relation between GBEs’ performance and the levels and 
changes in CEOs’ compensation. 
However, for 100% owned Australian GBEs, the absence of cash flow rights of the principal, 
being the government shareholder minister of the day, may be associated with a lack of 
incentives to monitor (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Additionally, the powers of the shareholder 
minister over board and CEO appointments has led to many political appointments and 
dismissals, some of which has attracted media attention (Ackerman 2006; Peatling 2012). It is 
questionable whether these political appointments possess the expertise and experience to 
effectively monitor the GBE’s performance and compensation practices. Given the current 
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governance structure of GBEs and the Chinese and Indian evidence of limited or no pay / 
performance relation our alternative hypothesis is: 
HAlt: There is no relation between GBEs’ performance and the levels and changes in 
CEOs’ compensation. 
We provide evidence on our hypothesis in the remainder of the paper. 
  
3.0 Sample, data and research design  
3.1  Sample 
The sample used in this study is based on hand-collected data for both Commonwealth 
(Australian Government), and State and Territory fully government owned GBEs for the years 
2006 – 2013 inclusive. Observations were deleted in those instances where (i) the Annual report 
was not available, (ii) the remuneration report or the related party transaction note did not 
disclose compensation details for the CEO, (iii) the outgoing CEO is in their final year and the 
incoming CEO is in their first year due to the non-disclosure of termination payments and sign-
on bonuses (Coulton and Taylor, 2002) and (iv) there were less than two consecutive years of 
operations. 
The initial sample comprised 115 GBEs with 814 firm year observations as depicted in Table 
1 – Panel A. 
<Insert Table 1 – Panel A & B here> 
The final sample comprised 83 Commonwealth, State and Territory GBEs and 430 firm year 
observations. The sample was also classified by jurisdiction comprising Commonwealth, State 
and Territory regions as well as the subsamples representing GBEs with and without CSOs, as 
detailed in Table 1 - Panel B. The state with the most observations is Victoria (VIC) with 27 
GBEs and 140 observations comprising 32.56% of the sample.  
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3.2 Data 
Compensation and governance data were hand collected from the annual reports of the GBEs. 
Financial statement data and operating statistics were also hand collected from the annual 
reports of the GBEs with the performance measures used based on accounting information.  
Although total remuneration paid to CEOs is ascertainable in most instances, the composition 
of the remuneration being salary, bonus, superannuation benefits, termination and sign-on 
payments in many instances were not disclosed separately. Consequently, the total dollar value 
of CEO compensation was used for the analysis. However, there were 94 observations 
disclosing bonus payments, and this sub-sample was analysed separately to test the 
pay/performance relation with the results included in the sensitivity analysis (Section 5).  
As not all GBEs included in the analysis have the same number of annual observations, the 
data comprise an unbalanced panel data set. For example, the sample includes two contiguous 
ranges for Transgrid, a New South Wales (NSW) state owned GBE for the years 2006 – 2009 
and 2012 – 2013, with 2010 and 2011 being excluded due to a departing CEO in 2010 and an 
incoming CEO in 2011.  
The dependent and independent variables used for the analysis of the pay/performance 
modelling are summarised in Table 2. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
The explanatory variables include three independent measures of performance that are used 
alternately, comprising: (i) return on assets (ROA) as an overall performance measure, (ii) profit 
margin (PM) as a measure of efficiency and (iii) asset turnover (ATO) as a measure of resource 
utilisation (Australian Government, 2015). Economic size variables used to control for size 
include total revenue (Ln Total Revenue) in the main tests and total assets (Ln Total Assets) in 
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the sensitivity analysis. Governance controls include board size (Board Size) being the total 
number of board members; the percentage of independent directors (%Indep Directors) being 
the percentage of non-executive directors to total directors; net board compensation13 (Ln $Net 
Board Comp) excluding CEO compensation in those situations where the CEO is a board 
member. Two additional governance variables are included to test for board effectiveness and 
governance oversight, the first of which is the presence of ex-public sector employees (being 
senior public servants and/or politicians) (Ex_Public Sector Dummy), whilst the second was  
directors who concurrently sit on Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed corporate sector 
boards (Corporate_Sector Dummy). Institutional control variables used in the tests include 
indicator variables comprising government grants (Gov_Grants_Dummy), net loss (Net Loss 
Dummy), regulated price (Regulated Price Dummy) and community service obligations (CSO 
Dummy) mandated by regulation. The amounts received for government grants are included in 
total revenues. However, not all GBEs receive government grants. Hence the indicator variable 
(Gov_Grants_Dummy) was introduced to examine whether direct government funding 
impacted on CEO compensation. The net loss indicator variable (Net Loss Dummy) was 
introduced to examine whether a loss affected CEO compensation or changes in CEO 
compensation. The regulated pricing indicator (Regulated Price Dummy) variable is used to 
examine whether capped pricing of output impacts on CEO compensation and/or changes in 
CEO compensation. An indicator variable for GBEs with CSOs is included to test whether 
GBEs with CSOs pay their CEOs less (CSO Dummy).  
Descriptive statistics for the data are included in Table 3.  
<Insert Table 3 here> 
                                                 
13 Net Board Compensation was calculated by deducting Total CEO Compensation from total board compensation 
in those situations where the CEO was also a board member. 
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The average CEO compensation is $435,800 with a standard deviation of $381,700. The 
highest paid CEO earned an annual salary of $4,751,831, and the minimum is $67,500. CEO 
compensation growth is approximately 9.08% per annum, which is more than double the 4.45% 
growth in average annual earnings.14 CEO bonus compensation ranged from a maximum of 
$1,998,950 to a minimum of $2,000 with the average being $165,000. However, from the total 
sample of 430 observations, there were only 94 instances where CEO bonus compensation  
disclosed.  
The performance measures report mean (median) results of 2.61% (2.35%) for ROA, 7.23% 
(9.23%) for PM and 0.43 (0.21) for ATO. The standard deviation for each performance measure 
is quite large evidencing volatility in the results.  
The two economic size controls being total revenue and total assets proxy for firm size and 
resource intensity respectively and both display significant dispersion for GBEs resulting from 
variations in (i) firm size, which may range from national coverage to major capital cities and 
smaller country towns and (ii) investment size due to the capital intensity requirements of 
GBEs. To reduce potential skewness, the natural logarithm of CEO compensation, economic 
size measures and net board compensation are used in the regression models.  
The average board size was seven members, with the largest board comprising twelve members 
and the smallest being two, with the percentage of independent directors averaging 90.54%. 
We also find that 47.9% of the GBEs included in our sample have at least one director with 
public listed company experience. However, this represents only 11.29% of the total director 
appointments (see Table 1 – Panel C). Hence, the boards typically are dominated by ex-public 
servants and politicians. The lack of public listed company experience for more than half the 
sample of GBE board members may be of concern for the effective governance of GBEs. 
                                                 
14 As per ABS report: 6302.0 Average Weekly Earnings - Table 3: reference table A85002151A. 
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Additionally, the ex-public sector indicator variable reports that 73.7% of CEO appointments 
are either ex-public sector employees or ex-politicians.  
Net board compensation (excluding CEO Compensation where the CEO is a board member) 
ranged from a maximum of $1,440,000 to a minimum of $23,380, with the average board 
compensation being approximately $293,000. Board compensation growth is approximately 
6.8% per annum, which, once again is at least 50% larger than the 4.45% growth in average 
annual earnings. 
Approximately 41.6% of the sample reported receiving government grants, 19.8% reported 
losses, regulated pricing affected 62.3% of the sample and community service obligations 
(CSOs) were reported for 26.3% of the sample. 
The correlations between the variables used to investigate the pay performance relation are 
reported in Table 4.   
<Insert Table 4 here> 
As expected, the size measures being total revenue and total assets, apart from being highly 
correlated with each other, also display high levels of correlation with both CEO compensation 
and net board compensation. Additional significant relationships disclosed in the correlation 
matrix exist between CEO compensation, board size and the performance measures of ROA, 
PM and ATO.  
 
3.3 Experimental design 
The pay/performance relationship is tested using a series of pooled panel data regressions. 
Model (1) examines the association between CEOs Total Compensation and GBEs 
performance based on four alternative performance measures. 
  
20 
Ln CEO Total Compit =αt + β1Performanceit + β2Economic Size Controlit +  
 β3Governance Controlsit + β4Institutional Controlsit + Ɛi    (1) 
 
Model (2) examines the association between the percentage change in CEO Total 
Compensation and the current year change in the GBEs’ performance measures, size, net board 
compensation and indicator variables related to governance and institutional controls.  
%∆CEO Compit = αt + β1ΔPerformanceit + β2%ΔEconomic Size Controlsit  + 
β3%∆Governance Controlsit + β4Governance Controlsit + β5Institutional 
Controlsit  + Ɛi         (2) 
Model (3) utilizes next year’s performance measures as the dependent variable to test whether 
current levels of CEO compensation provide an adequate incentive for improving next year’s 
performance. 
Performancet+1 =αt + β1 Ln CEO Total Compit + β2Economic Size Controlit +  
 β3Governance Controlsit + β4Institutional Controlsit + Ɛi    (3) 
The development and analysis of Model (3) may be subject to endogeneity concerns associated 
with reverse causality. The issue of reverse causality may exist, as it may be possible that CEO 
compensation influences performance measures and simultaneously performance measures 
may influence CEO compensation. That is, does pay drive performance or does performance 
drive pay? To control for endogeneity, an instrumental variable (IV) is developed based on the 
S&P Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes, and a two-stage regression 
analysis (2SLS) is performed. We base our IV on GICS codes as different industries have 
different levels of CEO pay independent of their economic performance (Murphy 2013).   
The IV (IV Rec GICS) is calculated as follows:  
IV Rec GICS = 1 ÷ [ΣGICS-GBE Cos ÷ Σ(GICS_GBE Cos + GICS_ASX Cos)] 
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The IV is based on the reciprocal15 of the total number of GBEs in a specific GICS industry 
category divided by the combined total of GBEs and ASX companies in that specific GICS 
industry. It is assumed that the scarcity16 of managerial talent within an industry group impacts 
on CEO compensation coupled with the fact that CEO compensation varies between different 
industries (Murphy 2013). As the GBEs can be classified using five GICS industry sectors, a 
unique IV measure is calculated for each GICS sector. The IV variables calculated are utilised 
for the panel data for all years and is utilised in the first stage of the two stage least squares 
regression. 
First stage OLS regression:  
Ln CEO Total Compit =αt + β2Economic Size Controlit + β3Governance Controlsit + 
 β4Institutional Controlsit + β3IV_Rec_GICSi + Ɛi 
Second stage OLS regression:  
Performanceit =αt + β1 Predicted ln CEO Total Compit + β2Economic Size Controlit +  
 β3Governance Controlsit + β4Institutional Controlsit + Ɛi   
The data, process and results are discussed in Section 4. 
4.0 Main results 
4.1 Results based on current levels of CEO Compensation driven by current 
performance measures 
                                                 
15 In order to consider both the IV variable and CEO Compensation on the basis of size, the reciprocal of the 
scarcity value was utilised in the models. 
16 The scarcity of managerial talent is determined by the size of the GBE industry (as measured by the number of 
GBEs) divided by the total number of companies (comprising the sum of GBE and ASX companies in the 
industry) in each specific GICS category. 
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Table 5 reports the results for Model (1) detailing the impact of the three  performance measures 
being (i) ROA (Col 1),  (ii) PM (Col 2), (iii) ATO (Col 3), and the combination of PM and 
ATO (Col 4) on CEO total compensation. Additionally, an interaction variable combining the 
background of board members (ex-public sector or corporate sector) with each of the 
performance measures employed to test for board effectiveness in determining CEO 
compensation. Fixed effects (FE)17 regression with robust standard errors is applied to the panel 
data regressions. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
The adjusted R-Squared and the F test statistic support the statistical significance of the model. 
Of the performance measures used, only asset turnover (ATO) (Col 3 and Col 4) return a 
significant result at the 10% and 5% level respectively, and in both instances, contrary to 
expectations, it negatively impacts CEO compensation. Hence, a 1% increase in ATO results 
in CEO compensation decreasing by 0.196% and 0.217% (Col 3 and 4 respectively).  
The result for the economic size variable (Ln Total Revenue) is significant in all four 
regressions. These results confirm findings of prior research in both the private sector (Murphy, 
2013; Matolcsy and Wright, 2007, 2011), the public sector (Cahan et al. 2005), for PSUs in 
India (Jaiswall and Bhattacharyya, 2016) and SOEs in China (Cao et al. 2018) that one of the 
major determinants of CEO Compensation is organisation size. Further, board compensation 
is positively associated with CEO compensation which is consistent with Brick et al (2006). 18 
                                                 
17 The Hausman test was used to determine whether to apply Fixed or Random Effects; the results of which 
specified Fixed Effects to be more suitable. 
18 Brick et al., (2006) find a significant positive relationship between CEO and director compensation with this 
excess compensation being associated with under-performance, which may be “due to mutual back scratching or 
cronyism”. Further, neither Jaiswall and Bhattacharyy, (2016)  for Indian PSUs nor Cao et al. (2018) for 
Chinese SOEs included board compensation as a dependent variable. 
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The results for the ex-public sector or corporate board indicator variables do not support an 
association between CEO compensation and the background of non-executive directors. 
However, the results on the interaction variables are significant on two occasions. In both cases, 
the ATO and ex-public sector interaction variable positively impacts on CEO compensation 
0.079% and 0.080 at the 10% level (Col. 3 and 4). This provides weak evidence supporting the 
notion that CEO pay is reduced when the majority of board members are ex-public sector 
employees. 
Apart from the regulated price indicator variable positively impacting on CEO compensation, 
0.165% and 0.164% at the 10% and 5% level respectively, (Col. 3and 4) and the net loss 
indicator variable being significant on one occasion 0.053% at the 10% level (Col. 3), none of 
the other indicator variables are significant. Consequently, Model (1) does not provide any 
evidence supporting a pay/performance relation. In fact, there are instances where the evidence 
suggests a negative association between performance measures and CEO compensation.  
4.2 Results for the impact of changes in performance measures on current changes 
in CEO Compensation  
Table 6 reports the results for Model (2) investigating the association between changes in CEO 
total compensation (%∆CEO Total Comp) and changes in the GBEs performance measures 
(ROA, PM and ATO). In all cases, the use of random effects19 (RE) regressions with robust 
standard errors are applied to the panel data. 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
                                                 
19 The Hausman test was used to determine whether to apply Fixed or Random Effects; the results of which 
specified Random Effects to be more suitable. 
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The overall R-Squared of the regressions and the Wald Chi2 statistic confirm the models’ 
statistical significance. On no occasion is a performance measure statistically significant, 
despite the fact that average annual CEO compensation increased by 9.08% annually over the 
period 2006 – 2013.20  Once again, the main significant drivers of changes in CEO 
compensation are the changes in the economic size (%∆Total Revenue) and change in net board 
compensation (%∆Net Board Comp). The percentage of independent directors (% Indep 
Directors) is also positive and significant at the 5% and 10% level. The positive and significant 
result may be counterintuitive, as an increase in board independence would be expected to be 
dilutive of CEO power. Our results suggest an increase in board independence may lead to 
board fragmentation providing the CEO with greater influence to capture the board (Bebchuk 
& Fried, 2005) and command salary increases irrespective of performance levels achieved.  
In addition, neither the ex-public sector nor the corporate sector indicator variables are 
significant. However, on one occasion from 10 instances, the profit margin and corporate sector 
performance interaction variable counterintuitively return a significant negative result -0.087% 
(at the 10% level – Col 4), thereby indicating that the change in CEO compensation was 
negatively impacted by having a board member with corporate sector experience. This finding 
provides weak evidence that the current GBE governance practices are ineffective in tying CEO 
pay to performance. 
4.3 Results based on future performance being driven by current levels of CEO 
compensation 
                                                 
20 Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics discloses that the average annual increase in CEO compensation over the period 
2006 -2013 was 9.29%. 
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Table 7 reports the results of estimating Model (3) examining the pay/performance relation 
from an incentives perspective. That is, do current levels of CEO compensation incentivise the 
CEO to achieve better future performance outcomes?   
<Insert Table 7 here> 
The R-Squared of the regressions and the Wald-Chi2 statistics indicate that the models are 
statistically significant. On no occasion does CEO Total Compensation have a significant 
positive impact on performance. As expected, the net loss indicator variable negatively impacts 
on CEO compensation when using the profit-based measures of ROA and PM (col. 1 and 2). 
Other significant results include: (i) negative impact of board size on CEO compensation on 
one occasion (Col 3), (ii) a positive impact of the ability to obtain government grants on CEO 
compensation on one occasion (Col. 2), (iii) the regulated price indicator variable as expected 
returns a negative result on one occasion (Col. 1). 
A major concern with the estimation of Model (3) is endogeneity. To address this issue, an 
instrumental variable (IV) that is assumed to be exogenous and uncorrelated with the error 
generated in the original OLS21 model is introduced into the first stage of a two stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression (Larcker and Rusticus 2010).  
In the first stage regression, the previously defined IV based on the GICS code is utilised. 
Further, the performance measures (ROA, PM and ATO) are excluded from the first stage 
(1SLS) as the objective is to generate a predicted value for CEO TOTAL COMPENSATION 
that is free from performance bias. 
The results for the first stage least squares (1SLS) are disclosed in Table 8.  
                                                 
21 Ordinary Least Squares results as reported in Table 7. 
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<Insert Table 8 here> 
The R2 and Wald Chi2 signifies the statistical significance of the three versions of the 1SLS for, 
Model (3). As expected the main drivers of CEO total compensation are total revenue and net 
board compensation with both measures significant at the 1% for all occurrences. An 
interesting result is the significant negative impact of the ex-public sector indicator variable on 
two occasions (Col. 1 and 2) and the positive impact of the corporate sector indicator variable 
on CEO compensation (Col. 1 and 2). The percentage of independent directors is statistically 
significant on a single occasion and has a negative impact on CEO compensation (Col. 3). Also, 
the ability to obtain government grants has a significant positive impact on CEO total 
compensation, once again, only on a single occasion (Col. 3).  
The negative significant result of -0.002% and -0.001% (Col 1 and Col 2 respectively) for the 
IV Rec_GICS variable provides support that the resultant predicted value of CEO total 
compensation is significantly affected by the IV and, accordingly, addresses the issue of 
endogeneity on two out of three instances. The determination of the impact of the IV is 
influenced by industry size22 and, as larger industries have greater access to managerial talent, 
the adjustment to CEO compensation to be used in the 2nd stage is smaller. This result is 
consistent with expectations and, consequently, adjusts the predicted value of CEO total 
compensation to cater for endogeneity in the second stage regression (2SLS). 
The results of the 2SLS23 are included in Table 9. In all cases, random effects (RE) regressions 
with robust standard errors are applied to the panel data set. 
<Insert Table 9 here> 
                                                 
22 Industry size as measured by the sum of GBEs and ASX companies classified according to GICS codes.  
23 The results reported were determined using the XTIVREG command in Stata, which is the 2SLS command 
applicable for the analysis of endogeneity associated with panel data. 
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The results in Table 9 confirm the findings in Table 7. The results of Model (3) using both OLS 
(Table 7) and 2SLS (Tables 8 and 9) do not provide statistically significant evidence supporting 
the notion that future performance is enhanced by the incentives provided by current levels of 
CEO compensation. Further, endogeneity is not a major issue as there is very little evidence of 
reverse causality between future performance and current levels of CEO compensation in either 
direction. As such, the use of future financial performance measures as dependent variables 
driven by current levels of CEO compensation do not provide statistically significant evidence 
in support of the pay/performance relation.  
5.0 Sensitivity Analysis 
5.1  Alternative economic, performance measures and compensation measures 
First, we substitute total assets and changes in total assets as the economic size measure to 
investigate whether an alternative economic size measure impacts on the pay/performance 
relation. Second, we use CEO bonus compensation in place of CEO total compensation to 
determine whether the reported bonus is linked to performance. Third, we substitute one year 
lagged performance measures to test whether the current year’s level and changes in CEO 
compensation are a reward for past performance. Finally, we include indicator variables for the 
largest state and largest industry as additional controls. The tenor of the results from these 
additional tests is consistent with those reported for the main tests with very little evidence of 
a significant pay/performance relation. 
6.0 Summary and some policy implications for the governance of GBEs 
The objective of this paper has been to provide evidence on the effectiveness of corporate 
governance of Australian GBEs as evidenced by the association between CEO compensation 
and GBE financial performance. The use of financial measures as an exogenous performance 
measure is justified on the basis of the legislative pronouncements and regulatory requirements 
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specifying that the annual report of GBEs must include an “Annual Performance Statement” 
(Australian Government, RMG 126, paragraph 3.13(a) page 14) that includes commentary on 
actual results matched with publicly disclosed performance expectations.  
The evidence provided in this paper is consistent with financial measures of performance being 
unrelated to the current level of CEOs’ compensation and the growth of CEOs’ compensation 
between 2006 and 2013. Our results are robust with respect to a number of alternative variable 
definitions and econometric specifications. In summary, our evidence does not support the 
hypothesis that “there is a positive relation between GBEs’ performance and the levels and 
changes of their CEOs’ compensation”. 
Our results may provide some guidance to policy makers. First, policy makers could consider 
the composition of the board of directors by requiring that the majority of board members have 
public listed company based board experience. Further, boards could be required to have a 
compensation/remuneration sub-committee, where the chair of this subcommittee is required 
to have extensive corporate sector experience. Second, to overcome the possible cronyisms 
associated with ministerial and government changes (Davies, 2015), corporate governance 
reform for GBEs could incorporate the formation of a bipartisan committee comprising elected 
politicians from all sides of the political spectrum to act as a nomination committee for board 
appointments for GBEs. Third, the levels of and changes in the compensation of CEOs could 
either be determined by an external tribunal consistent with the determination of politicians’ 
salaries and benchmarked against relevant public listed companies. Finally, the compensation 
could be explicitly divided into fixed and bonus components. The bonus payment could be a 
significant proportion of the total compensation and tied to explicit, measurable financial 
benchmarks which are disclosed in the annual reports. 
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Table 1: Panel A - Sample construction covering the period 2006 – 2013 inclusive 
Sample Selection – Number of GBEs and GBE Years 
 GBEs Observations 
1. Number of GBEs - Commonwealth and State (116) 115 814 
2. Exclude GBEs and observations where there is no Annual 
Report 
-9 -51 
3. Exclude GBEs and observations where there is inconclusive 
or missing remuneration data 
-19 -142 
Subtotal 87 621 
4. Exclude Observations for Departing CEO in final year   -91 
5. Exclude Observations for Incoming CEO in first year   -91 
6. Exclude Observations for GBEs where there is less than 2 
complete years of operations 
-4 -9 
Final Sample Size after exclusions 83 430 
 
Table 1: Panel B – Sample observations by State and CSOs 
Number of
GBEs
Number of
Observations
GBEs with 
CSOs
GBEs Without 
CSOs
% of
Observations
3 10 6 4 2.33%
3 18 0 18 4.19%
12 69 0 69 16.05%
1 4 0 4 0.93%
14 71 0 71 16.51%
1 6 0 6 1.40%
4 10 0 10 2.33%
27 140 95 45 32.56%
18 102 12 90 23.72%
83 430 113 317 100.00%
Western Australia (WA)
Australian Capital Territory (ACT)
Commonwealth Government
Jurisdictions
Number of GBEs and Observations by Jurisdiction with / without CSOs
Total
New South Wales (NSW)
Northern Territory (NT)
South Australia (SA)
Tasmania (TAS)
Victoria (VIC)
Queensland QLD
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Table 1: Panel C – Background of Director Appointments 
Background of Board Appointments Numbers Overall Averages
% Ex Senior Public Servant 2,482                  79%
% Ex politician 300                      10%
% Directors who sit on Public Listed Company boards 354                      11%
Total 3,136                  100%
 
Table 2 – Variables used in Empirical tests 
Total CEO Compensation $CEO Total Comp
 % Change in CEO Compensation % ∆ CEO Comp
CEO Bonus Payment $CEO Bonus
 Return on Assets =  After Tax Operating Profit ÷ Total (EOY) Assets ROA %t
 Profit Margin = After Tax Net Profit ÷ Total Operating Revenue Profit Margin %t
 Asset Turnover = Total Operating Revenue ÷ Total (EOY) Assets Asset Turnovert
Total Revenue $Total Revenuet
Total Assets $Total Assetst
Number of Directors # Board Sizet
% Independent Variable (Ind Directors ÷ Total Directors) %Ind Directort
Board member was either ex politician or ex public servant (=1) Ex_Public Sector Dummy
GBE Board member also sits on a corporate sector board (=1) Corporate Sector Dummy
Net Board Compensation (Total Board Comp - CEO Comp) $Net Board Compt
Government Grants & CSO (1 = Gov Grants) Gov Grants Dummyt
Loss Dummy (To be included in all regressions) 1 = Loss Net Loss Dummyt
 Regulated Pricing Dummy (1 = Legislated Pricing) Reg Price Dummyt
 Community Service Obligations - CSO_Dummy CSO_Dummyt
Institutional Controls
Governance Controls
Dependent Variables
Economic Size Controls
Performance Measures
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Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Statistics Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum No. Obs.
 $CEO Total Comp  ($000) 435.8             355.0             381.7             67.5               4,751.8           430
 % ∆ CEO Comp 9.08% 5.33% 19.09% -44.31% 196.67% 331
CEO Bonus Compensation ($000) 165.0             67.3               286.7             2.0                  1,998.9           94
 ROA % 2.61% 2.35% 5.77% -45.69% 30.35% 430
 Profit Margin % (PM) 7.23% 9.23% 27.85% -294.64% 85.68% 430
 Asset-Turnover (ATO) 0.43               0.21               0.61               0.02               3.67                 430
 $Total Revenue ($000) 734,000        217,000        1,170,000     5,938             6,830,000       430
 $Total Assets ($000) 2,470,000     991,000        3,430,000     8,442             21,500,000    430
Number of Directors 7.04 7 1.43 2 12 430
%Ind Director 90.5% 87.5% 9.4% 50.0% 100.0% 430
 Ex_Public Sector Dummy 73.7% 100.0% 44.1% 0.0% 100.0% 430
Corporate Sector Dummy 47.9% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0% 430
$Net Board Compensation ($000) 293                 250                 227                 23                   1,440               430
%∆$Net_Board_Comp 6.8% 2.8% 25.9% -87.8% 254.2% 331
Government Grants Dummy 41.6% 0.0% 49.4% 0.0% 100.0% 430
Net Loss Dummy 19.8% 0.0% 39.9% 0.0% 100.0% 430
Regulated Price Dummy 62.3% 100.0% 48.5% 0.0% 100.0% 430
CSO Dummy 26.3% 0.0% 44.1% 0.0% 100.0% 430
 Institutional Controls 
 Governance Controls 
Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variables
Perfromance Measures
 Economic Size Controls 
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Table 4 – Correlation Matrix – PEARSON & SPEARMAN (above the diagonal) 
Ln CEO Total 
Comp
% ∆ CEO 
Comp
ROA %
Profit Margin 
%
Asset-
Turnover
Ln Total 
Revenue
Ln Total 
Assets
# Board 
Size
% Indep 
Directors
Ln Net Board 
Comp
Ln CEO Total Comp 1 0.069 0.295* 0.131* 0.417* 0.825* 0.683* 0.115* -0.021 0.626*
% ∆ CEO Comp 0.177* 1 0.106 0.095 0.055 -0.034 -0.049 0.015 0.076 -0.087
ROA 0.165* 0.081 1 0.767* 0.528* 0.164* -0.053 -0.111* -0.019 0.133*
Profit Margin 0.085 0.054 0.736* 1 0.083 0.018 0.022 -0.086 -0.002 0.102
Asset-Turnover 0.258* 0.030 0.150* -0.009 1 0.389* -0.081 -0.123* 0.011 0.144*
Ln Total Revenue 0.772* -0.010 0.101 0.051 0.258* 1 0.863* 0.218* -0.050 0.664*
Ln Total Assets 0.588* -0.043 -0.055 -0.015 -0.230* 0.843* 1 0.280* -0.066 0.635*
Board Size 0.154* -0.004 0.017 0.020 -0.063 0.237* 0.303* 1 0.134* 0.260*
% Indep Directors -0.025 0.106 0.076 0.088 0.031 -0.058 -0.083 0.155* 1 -0.151*
Ln $Net Board Comp 0.582* 0.007 0.026 0.021 0.049 0.608* 0.575* 0.189* -0.213* 1
 
* Significant at 5% level.
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Table 5 
Model 1 investigating the association between CEO Total Compensation and 
performance. 
Ln CEO Total Compit =αt + β1Performanceit + β2Economic Size Controlit + 
β3Governance Controlsit + β4Institutional Controlsit + Ɛi 
Dependent Variable
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 
S
ig
n
ln CEO Total 
Comp
(Col 1)
ln CEO Total 
Comp
(Col 2)
ln CEO Total 
Comp
(Col 3)
ln CEO Total 
Comp
(Col 4)
ROA%it + 0.110                
(0.185)                
Profit Margin % + -0.033 -0.043
(-0.189) (-0.238)
Asset Turnoverit + -0.196* -0.217**
(-1.928) (-2.163)
ROA * Ex_Public Sector Dummy + -0.401                
(0.709)                
ROA * Corporate Sector Dummy + 0.156                
(0.295)                
PM * Ex_Public Sector Dummy + -0.050 -0.039
(-0.304) (-0.228)
PM * Corporate Sector Dummy + -0.041 -0.055
(-0.536) (-0.691)
ATO * Ex_Public Sector Dummy + 0.079* 0.080*
(1.691) (1.760)
ATO * Corporate Sector Dummy + 0.056 0.056
(1.142) (1.133)
Ln Total Revenueit + 0.252*** 0.267*** 0.271*** 0.300***
(5.768) (6.653) (4.726) (5.534)
Board Sizeit + -0.013 -0.012 -0.015 -0.014
(-1.246) (-1.172) (-1.403) (-1.326)
% Indep Directorsit + -0.056 -0.050 -0.109 -0.084
(-0.241) (-0.209) (-0.453) (-0.344)
Ex_Public Sector Dummy +/- -0.032 -0.033 -0.059 -0.055
(-0.688) (-0.743) (-1.234) (-1.183)
Corporate Sector Dummy +/- 0.000 0.010 -0.005 0.004
(0.005) (0.358) (-0.161) (0.123)
Ln $Net Board Compit + 0.219*** 0.213*** 0.206*** 0.195***
(3.126) (3.115) (2.936) (2.842)
Gov Grants Dummyit + 0.059 0.055 0.053 0.048
(1.382) (1.287) (1.191) (1.088)
Net Loss Dummyit - 0.038 0.014 0.053* 0.016
(1.078) (0.474) (1.931) (0.544)
Regulated Price Dummyit - 0.167 0.149 0.165* 0.164**
(1.362) (1.245) (1.860) (2.015)
Constant 5.333*** 5.117*** 5.252*** 4.822***
(4.785) (4.727) (4.497) (4.258)
Adjusted R
2 0.343 0.353 0.349 0.362
F 7.758 7.77 8.977 7.779
Number of Observations 430 430 430 430
Fixed Effects FE FE FE FE
                                                    Note:  (i)   T-statistics are listed below the coefficient estimates. 
                                                              (ii) ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels
Performance Measures
Economic Size Control
Governance Controls
Institutional Controls
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Table 6 
Model 2 investigating the association between changes in CEO Total Compensation and 
changes in GBEs performance. 
%∆CEO Compit = αt + β1ΔPerformanceit + β2%ΔEconomic Size Controlsit +  
  β3%∆Governance Controlsit + β4Governance Controlsit +  
  β5Institutional Controlsit  + Ɛi  
Dependent Variable
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 
S
ig
n
%∆CEO Total 
Comp
(Col 1)
%∆CEO Total 
Comp
(Col 2)
%∆CEO Total 
Comp
(Col 3)
%∆CEO Total 
Comp
(Col 4)
∆ROAit + -0.200                  
(-0.762)                  
∆Profit Margin it + 0.064 0.070
(0.676) (0.708)
∆Asset Turnoverit + -0.227 -0.348
(-0.971) (-1.577)
∆ROA * Ex_Public Sector Dummy + -0.041
(-0.200)
∆ROA * Corporate Sector Dummy +/- 0.306
(1.253)
∆PM * Ex_Public Sector Dummy + -0.105 -0.110
(-1.189) (-1.180)
∆PM * Corporate Sector Dummy +/- -0.065 -0.087*
(-1.290) (-1.722)
∆ATO * Ex_Public Sector Dummy + 0.062 0.128
(0.312) (0.661)
∆ATO * Corporate Sector Dummy +/- 0.128 0.230
(0.579) (1.076)
%∆Total_Revenueit + 0.107** 0.127** 0.114** 0.144** *
(1.961) (2.562) (1.975) (2.719)
Board Sizeit + 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.050) (-0.013) (-0.010) (-0.015)
% Indep Directorsit + 0.162** 0.156* 0.153* 0.153*
(1.979) (1.909) (1.916) (1.904)
Ex_Public Sector Dummy + 0.027 0.031 0.028 0.031
(1.066) (1.201) (1.136) (1.241)
Corporate Sector Dummy - 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.008
(0.539) (0.554) (0.508) (0.442)
%∆$Net_Board_Compit + 0.141* 0.134** 0.129* 0.115*
(1.923) (2.066) (1.774) (1.913)
Gov_Grants_Dummyit + -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006
(0.206) (-0.211) (-0.277) (-0.278)
Net Loss Dummyit  - 0.004 -0.010 0.011 -0.008
(0.134) (-0.322) (0.399) (-0.273)
Regulated Price Dummyit - -0.013 -0.008 -0.013 -0.011
(-0.587) (-0.377) (-0.618) (-0.483)
CSO Dummyit - -0.015 -0.011 -0.017 -0.013
(-0.560) (-0.390) (-0.612) (-0.441)
Constant + -0.096 -0.096 -0.085 -0.089
(-1.375) (-1.346) (-1.215) (-1.246)
R
2 
(Overall) 0.210 0.221 0.213 0.232
Wald chi
2 41.800*** 28.200*** 19.610 30.690***
Number of Observations 331 331 331 331
Random Effects RE RE RE RE
Note: (i)  The ‘z’ score statistics are determined using robust standard errors and are reported in brackets.
         (ii) ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels.
∆Performance Measures
∆Economic Size Control
Governance Controls & ∆Governance Controls
Institutional Controls
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Table 7 
Model 3 - Test of whether the current level of CEO compensation provides an incentive for 
improving next year’s performance. 
Performancet+1 =αt + β1 Ln CEO Total Compit + β2Economic Size Controlit + 
β3Governance Controlsit + β4Institutional Controlsit + Ɛi 
 
Dependent Variable 
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 
S
ig
n
ROAit+1
(Col 1)
Profit Marginit+1
(Col 2)
Asset Turnoverit+1
(Col 3)
Ln CEO Total Compit + 0.010 0.053 0.054
(0.577) (1.625) (0.732)
Ln Total Revenueit + 0.002 -0.014 0.109
(0.517) (-0.972) (1.130)
Board Sizeit + 0.004 0.008 -0.027**
(1.559) (0.952) (-1.989)
% Indep Directorsit + 0.033 0.313 -0.039
(0.895) (1.509) (-0.199)
Ex_Public Sector Dummy + -0.016 -0.047 -0.070
(-1.488) (-1.619) (-1.231)
Corporate Sector Dummy - 0.001 -0.042 -0.005
(0.133) (-1.711) (-0.106)
Ln_$Net_Board_Compit + -0.006 0.018 -0.061
(-1.458) (0.851) (-0.646)
Gov_Grants_Dummyit + -0.001 0.083** -0.071
(-0.221) (2.216) (-1.783)
Net Loss Dummyit - -0.023** -0.210*** 0.017
(-2.185) (-3.717) (0.525)
Regulated Price Dummyit - -0.033*** -0.051 0.073
(-3.361) (-1.206) (0.600)
CSO_Dummyit - -0.001 -0.044 -0.272
(-0.134) (-0.935) (-1.925)
Constant -0.099 -0.803 -1.231
(-0.599) (-1.460) (-1.322)
R
2 
(Overall) 0.149 0.129 0.133
Wald chi
2 50.350*** 65.050*** 20.580*
Number of Observations 331 331 331
Random Effects RE RE RE
Note: (i)  The ‘z’ score statistics are determined using robust standard errors and are reported in brackets.
         (ii) ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels.
Economic Size Control
Governance Controls
Institutional Controls
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Table 8 
Model 3 – First Stage Least Squares Regression (1SLS) regression with Ln CEO Total 
Comp being the Dependent variable and the introduction of the Instrumental Variable 
(IV Rec_GICS) as a regressor. 
Ln CEO Total Compit =αt + β1Economic Size Controlit + β2Governance Controlsit +  
  β3Institutional Controlsit + β4IV_Rec_GICSi + Ɛi 
 
Dependent Variable
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 
S
ig
n
ln CEO Total 
Comp
(Col 1)
ln CEO Total 
Comp
(Col 2)
ln CEO Total 
Comp
(Col 3)
Ln Total Revenueit + 0.170*** 0.166*** 0.192***
(9.050) (9.496) (6.964)
Board Sizeit + -0.006 -0.005 -0.010
(-0.430) (-0.342) (-1.020)
% Indep Directorsit + -0.048 0.015 -0.729***
(-0.280) (0.101) (-2.658)
Ex_Public Sector Dummy +/- -0.121*** -0.126*** -0.025
(-2.740) (-2.883) (-0.506)
Corporate Sector Dummy +/- 0.061* 0.087** 0.032
(1.740) (2.380) (1.242)
Ln $Net Board Compit + 0.162*** 0.152*** 0.254***
(5.110) (5.600) (4.847)
Gov Grants Dummyit + -0.038 -0.044 0.097***
(-0.950) (-1.178) (3.080)
Net Loss Dummyit - -0.054 -0.098*** 0.034
(-1.630) (-2.834) (1.277)
Regulated Price Dummyit - 0.009 0.018 0.134
(0.140) (0.285) (1.330)
CSO_Dummyit - -0.060 -0.062 -0.142
(-0.690) (-0.713) (-0.863)
IV Rec GICS + / - -0.002* -0.001* -0.003
(-1.900) (-1.698) (-0.868)
Constant 7.750*** 7.871*** 6.658***
(16.490) (17.930) (8.972)
R
2 
(Overall) 0.628 0.656 0.634
Wald chi
2 
(G2SLS Stage 1) 170*** 804*** 170***
Number of Observations 331 331 331
Random Effects RE RE RE
Economic Size Control
Governance Controls
Institutional Controls
Note: (i)  The ‘z’ score statistics are determined using robust standard errors and are reported in brackets.
         (ii) ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels.
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Table 9 
Model 3 – Second Stage Least Squares Regression (2SLS) investigating the association 
between future performance based on the inclusion of the predicted value of CEO Total 
Comp (from 1SLS). 
Performanceit =αt + β1 Predicted ln CEO Total Compit + β2Economic Size Controlit + 
 β3Governance Controlsit + β4Institutional Controlsit + Ɛi  
 
Dependent Variable
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 
S
ig
n
ROAit+1
(Col 1)
Profit 
Marginit+1
(Col 2)
Asset 
Turnoverit+1
(Col 3)
Predicted Ln CEO Total Compit + 0.017 0.799 -1.653
(0.174) (1.311) (-0.914)
Ln Total Revenueit + 0.001 -0.131 0.374
(0.067) (-1.262) (0.757)
Board_Sizeit + 0.004 0.008 0.079
(1.531) (0.514) (0.966)
% Indep Directorsit + 0.033 0.327 -0.044
(0.906) (1.252) (-1.528)
Ex_Public Sector Dummy +/- -0.015 0.053 -0.102
(-0.940) (0.466) (-0.662)
Corporate Sector Dummy +/- 0.000 -0.103 0.051
(0.053) (-1.593) (0.646)
Ln $Net Board Compit + -0.006 -0.095 -1.291
(0.454) (-1.048) (-0.897)
Gov Grants Dummyit + -0.001 0.117* 0.099
(-0.187) (1.930) (0.569)
Net Loss Dummyit - -0.024* -0.128 0.447
(-1.835) (-1.440) (1.273)
Regulated Price Dummyit - -0.033*** -0.111 0.354
(-3.029) (-1.216) (1.092)
CSO_Dummyit -0.001 0.017 -0.437
(-0.075) (0.116) (-1.331)
Constant -0.154 -6.793 9.776
(-0.195) (-1.365) (0.793)
R
2 
(Overall) 0.152 0.039 0.004
Wald chi
2 
(G2SLS Stage 2) 56*** 22** 8
Number of Observations 331 331 331
Random Effects RE RE RE
       Note: (i)  The ‘z’ score statistics are determined using robust standard errors and are reported in brackets.
                 (ii) ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ indicate two tailed statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels.
Predicted CEO Compensation
Economic Size Control
Governance Controls
Institutional Controls
 
 
 
